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I. INTRODUCTION
OVER the last three decades, global commerce has been irrevoca-bly changed by the digital revolution. The widespread prolifera-tion of affordable computers, the introduction of the internet,
and the growth of mobile-phone technology have changed the way that
companies and individuals purchase many of their goods and services.
Unfortunately, these advances have come in tandem with a host of new
challenges, culminating in the birth and quick rise of “cybercrime.” In
2017 alone, the perpetration of cybercrime cost consumers around the
globe a whopping $172 billion.1 Consumers are not the only targets of
cybercrime. In 2012, a prolific hacker announced plans to rob a large
number of the United States’ leading banks in an act that was seen as a
protest against the rich.2 A reputable computer security firm estimated
that these attacks could cause losses of “hundreds of millions of dollars,”
and it was later confirmed that the hacker had “claimed at least 500 cyber
victims.”3 Experts have estimated that cybercrime could cost the global
economy more than $6 trillion annually by 2021.4
Despite the growing cost of cybercrime to the U.S. economy, the gov-
ernment response remains woefully inadequate. The government has ad-
vised victims of cyberattacks to merely “contact[ ] the system
administrator from the attacking computer to request assistance.”5 Mean-
while, victimized American institutions have spent millions to try to re-
buff cybercrime and have begun to actively call for the ability to address
cybercriminals with offensive—rather than defensive—measures.6 While
many might suggest that the U.S. military or law enforcement agencies
should be responsible for any attempts at aggressive retribution, it is clear
that even though “there are numerous individuals with hacking or other
computer-savvy abilities, most of these individuals are not within” the
armed forces or law enforcement communities.7 Besides, the Department
of Defense has made it clear that its cybersecurity personnel are focused
on national security and the protection of government network infra-
1. 2017 Norton Cyber Security Insights Report, SYMANTEC CORP. 4 (2017), https://
www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/about/2017-ncsir-global-results-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GWD6-PAS3].
2. Christopher M. Kessinger, Hitting the Cyber Marque: Issuing a Cyber Letter of
Marque to Combat Digital Threats, ARMY LAW., Aug. 2013, at 4, 12.
3. Id.
4. Abigail Summerville, Protect Against the Fastest-Growing Crime: Cyber Attacks,
CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/25/stay-protected-from-the-uss-fastest-growing-
crime-cyber-attacks.html [https://perma.cc/3D5E-8JT5] (last updated July 26, 2017, 3:53
PM).
5. Kessinger, supra note 2, at 12 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING
COMPUTER CRIMES 180 (2007), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ccmanual
.pdf [https://perma.cc/T88C-DL5P]).
6. Id.
7. SAMUEL P. MOWERY, DEFINING CYBER AND FOCUSING THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN
CYBERSPACE 13 (2013); B. Nathaniel Garrett, Comment & Case Note, Taming the Wild
Wild Web: Twenty-First Century Prize Law and Privateers as a Solution to Combating
Cyber-Attacks, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 683, 698 (2012).
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structure, rather than the interests of private companies and individuals.8
Practically speaking, “The current law, and seemingly political position, is
basically forcing U.S. companies to ‘just stand and take a beating.’”9
Recently, cybercrime has undergone new developments influenced by
the growing popularity and accessibility of “cryptocurrency.” Cryptocur-
rencies are “unique, typically encrypted, computer files that can be con-
verted to or from a government-backed currency to purchase goods and
services from merchants that accept virtual currencies.”10 In the last ten
years, the development of cryptocurrency has threatened to further dis-
rupt the commercial space by fundamentally changing the way that con-
sumers and businesses conceptualize and use money. Even the least tech-
savvy have heard of one of the most widely used cryptocurrencies:
Bitcoin. Bitcoin is an “anonymous, on-line currency . . . generated by
computation (‘mining’), purchase, or trade.”11 While Bitcoin does offer a
secure alternative payment option for online businesses, it too comes with
negatives, like all of the technological advances before it. The anonymity
provided by Bitcoin transactions has enabled a whole host of criminal
activities to be committed online, including “arms sales, drug dealing,
human trafficking, murder-for-hire, money laundering, sale of child porn,
and sanctions busting.”12 Bitcoin has also been subject to speculation.
While a Bitcoin (using the ticker BTC) could be purchased for roughly $2
in late 2011,13 the exchange rate shot up to nearly $20,000 per BTC in
2017 before quickly cratering back to an average of around $7,500 per
BTC in 2018.14 As of this writing, Bitcoin’s exchange rate is still high
relative to its mid-2010 beginnings, as a single Bitcoin can be purchased
for approximately $8,000.15
Despite Bitcoin’s budding potential for criminality and seeming price
instability, “it is clear that not only have thousands of blockchain applica-
tions been launched, but the biggest firms in many industries are invest-
8. See Molly Picard, Comment, Cyberspace: The 21st-Century Battlefield Exposing
Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines to Potential Civil Liabilities, 4 NAT’L SEC. L.J. 125,
139–41 (2015).
9. Kessinger, supra note 2, at 12–13 (quoting Jeff Bardin, Caution: Not Executing
Offensive Actions Against Our Adversaries Is High Risk, CSO (Nov. 29, 2012), https://www
.csoonline.com/article/2136485/caution—not-executing-offensive-actions-against-our-adver
saries-is-high-risk.html [https://perma.cc/6VR6-6BMQ]).
10. Sumit Agarwal, Note, Bitcoin Transactions: A Bit of Financial Privacy, 35 CAR-
DOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 153, 158 (2016) (quoting What You Should Know About Virtual
Currencies, CAL. DEP’T OF BUS. OVERSIGHT (Apr. 2014), https://dbo.ca.gov/wp-content/
uploads/sites/296/2019/02/Virtual_Currencies_0414.pdf [https://perma.cc/AQ2Z-LK72]).
11. Eric Engle, Is Bitcoin Rat Poison? Cryptocurrency, Crime, and Counterfeiting
(CCC), 16 J. HIGH TECH. L. 340, 341 (2016).
12. Id. at 333–44.
13. Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4 HAS-
TINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 159, 160 (2012).
14. Michael Rosenblat, Bitcoin Price Speculation for 2019, YAHOO FIN. (Dec. 27,
2018), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/bitcoin-price-speculation-2019-103004792.html
[https://perma.cc/P74P-93ZY].
15. United States Dollar to Bitcoin (USD to BTC), MKTS. INSIDER, https://markets.busi
nessinsider.com/currency-converter/united-states-dollar_btc [https://perma.cc/H63R-
CWL6] (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
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ing substantial amounts of resources in blockchain-related efforts.”16
This, in combination with the rapid appreciation of Bitcoin value in the
last five years, has caused an enormous upswing in the frequency of
Bitcoin theft, or cyber piracy. By 2014, over $500 million worth of Bitcoin
had been lost or stolen by cybercriminals,17 and in just the first half of
2018 cybercriminals stole over $1.1 billion of cryptocurrency.18 Businesses
were targeted the second most in 2018, bearing twenty-one percent of the
losses generated by cryptocurrency theft.19 The United States bore the
brunt of cryptocurrency-related thefts, with over twenty-four separate in-
stances reported in 2018.20 Cryptocurrency theft has become a large prob-
lem in the international community too, as one of the world’s top Bitcoin
exchanges by volume traded was ransacked by cybercriminals for over
$30 million worth of cryptocurrencies in June 2018.21 In the January 2017
hack of Japanese cryptocurrency exchange Coincheck, hackers made off
with approximately $500 million worth of cryptocurrencies.22 Because
cryptocurrency theft is only going to become a more prevalent problem
as more vendors and larger parts of society accept the technology, many
scholars have sought legal methods for victims of cybercrime to fight
back.
This paper aims to present a viable method for businesses and individu-
als to combat cyber piracy through a mechanism that is already present in
the U.S. Constitution. Under Article I, Section Eight, “Congress shall
have Power To . . . grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal.”23 Traditionally,
a letter of marque authorized a private citizen to capture the naval vessels
and property of ships sailing under an enemy flag during times of esca-
lated hostilities between two nations.24 From the fifteenth century until
the mid-nineteenth century, letters of marque and reprisal were also used
by different nations to augment their naval forces in the struggle against
piracy on the high seas through the use of privateers.25 At the time of the
American Revolutionary War, it was generally accepted that a “priva-
16. Benito Arrun˜ada, Blockchain’s Struggle to Deliver Impersonal Exchange, 19 MINN.
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 55, 56 (2018).
17. Nicole D. Swartz, Comment, Bursting the Bitcoin Bubble: The Case to Regulate
Digital Currency as a Security or Commodity, 17 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 319, 324
(2014).
18. Kate Rooney, $1.1 Billion in Cryptocurrency Has Been Stolen This Year, and It





21. Jethro Mullen, Top Bitcoin Exchange Says Over $30 Million in Cryptocurrencies
Stolen, CNN BUS. (June 20, 2018, 5:54 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/06/19/technology/
bithumb-bitcoin-cryptocurrencies-theft/index.html [https://perma.cc/7W63-NBKL].
22. Id.
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
24. J. Gregory Sidak, The Quasi War Cases—And Their Relevance to Whether “Letters
of Marque and Reprisal” Constrain Presidential War Powers, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
465, 473 (2005).
25. See William Young, Note, A Check on Faint-Hearted Presidents: Letters of Marque
and Reprisal, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 895, 900, 907 (2009).
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teer . . . was a ship armed and fitted out at private expense for the pur-
pose of preying on the enemy’s commerce to the profit of her owners,
and bearing a commission, or letter of marque, authorizing her to do so,
from the Government.”26 Other scholars have noted that “the rules con-
cerning private actor responses to piracy and other unlawful behavior on
the high seas” are quite likely “the closest historical analog for today’s
private sector response to unlawful cyber activity.”27 This is true because,
“[l]ike the high seas, the cyber realm is not confined within the territory
of individual states . . . [and] it has become a vital pathway of commerce
and communication.”28 Privateers were a necessary tool to supplement
national navies because “[t]he vastness of seas [allowed] pirates [to] eas-
ily commit their crimes undetected.”29
While the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal has lain dor-
mant since the War of 1812,30 Congress should revive the practice to ef-
fectively authorize “cyber privateers” that would efficiently and cheaply
address the growing problem of cyber piracy related to cryptocurrency in
private commerce. Part II of this paper addresses the general history of
privateering and specifically focuses on past usage of letters of marque
and reprisal by the United States. Part III covers the basic characteristics
of Bitcoin as the most widespread cryptocurrency and further examines
exactly how Bitcoin is stolen. Part IV recommends a theoretical frame-
work for the use of letters of marque to create cyber privateers, and ad-
dresses the important role that Bitcoin would serve as the incentive for
private entities to operate as cyber privateers. Finally, Part V concludes
by analyzing the legal and practical concerns that have been raised by
critics of the revival of privateering and discusses several of the possible
solutions to these issues.31
II. A REMARQUEABLE HISTORY
A. ORIGINS AND GOLDEN AGE OF PRIVATEERS
Letters of marque and reprisal have a long and storied history, first
originating in the fifth century as the remnants of the Western Roman
Empire disintegrated and piracy became more common in the Mediterra-
26. Id. at 896–97 (quoting EDGAR STANTON MACLAY, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRI-
VATEERS 7 (1899)).
27. Paul Rosenzweig, International Law and Private Actor Active Cyber Defensive
Measures, 50 STAN. J. INT’L L. 103, 110 (2014).
28. Jeremy Rabkin & Ariel Rabkin, Navigating Conflicts in Cyberspace: Legal Lessons
from the History of War at Sea, 14 CHI. J. INT’L L. 197, 202 (2013).
29. Jennifer J. Rho, Comment, Blackbeards of the Twenty-First Century: Holding
Cybercriminals Liable Under the Alien Tort Statute, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 695, 713 (2007)
(quoting Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy
Reveals About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111, 152
(2004)).
30. Young, supra note 25, at 897.
31. This paper will not consider the military and national security uses of cyber priva-
teering or the possibility of cyber privateers being used to “hack back” in the case of a data
breach.
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nean Sea.32 Scholars have theorized that the use of privateers reflected
the power vacuum left by the Roman Empire as the feudal European
states struggled to provide “private redress and protection of com-
merce.”33 These proto-letters of marque and reprisal “authorized private
merchant ships to carry arms in self-defense.”34 Privateering was widely
recognized as separate from piracy, with piracy often carrying harsh pun-
ishments while “acts of privateering were explicitly authorized and gov-
erned by the rule of law.”35 In the leadup to the Italian Renaissance, as
trade began to flourish again in the Mediterranean, privateering authori-
zations evolved to include many of the restrictions and stipulations that
would continue to be used through the decline of privateering.36 These
later examples showed a shift away from use of privateering authoriza-
tions as a self-defense measure, as they allowed privateers to “act on [the
government’s] behalf and seize property belonging to an enemy govern-
ment, usually in the form of ships and cargo.”37 They often included strict
limits on “the amount that could be captured” and frequently “contained
an expiration date, after which any capture would be deemed piracy.”38
This practice of authorizing private individuals to attack enemy com-
merce and combat piracy spread to “the rest of Western Europe by the
end of the fourteenth century.”39
The very first modern letters of marque and reprisal were created by
English statute around 1354.40 While the letters would often be combined
into a single document in later usage, letters of marque and letters of
reprisal initially had separate meanings.41 “A letter of marque authorized
seizures outside of the sovereign’s local jurisdiction” while “a letter of
reprisal allowed privateers to capture property within the immediate ju-
risdiction of the sovereign.”42 Once a privateer had captured an enemy
vessel, the privateer would be required to return the vessel and its cargo
to one of the letter issuers’ ports.43 The captured vessel would be turned
over to that nation’s prize courts, which would evaluate the claims of
ownership and determine whether the vessel was lawfully taken within
the authorization provided by the privateer’s letter of marque.44 If the
capture was legitimate, the vessel would be condemned and sold, and the
privateer would retain a portion of the proceeds from the sale (as out-
lined in their letter of marque) while the rest would be seized by the
32. Young, supra note 25, at 900.
33. Id.
34. Kessinger, supra note 2, at 6.
35. Garrett, supra note 7, at 688.
36. Young, supra note 25, at 900.
37. Kessinger, supra note 2, at 6.
38. Garrett, supra note 7, at 688.
39. Young, supra note 25, at 900.
40. Garrett, supra note 7, at 688.
41. See id. at 688–89.
42. Id. at 689.
43. Id. at 688.
44. Id.
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state.45 This procedure was replicated by the major European powers and
was used extensively during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.46 By
1625, privateers were a common and accepted part of the naval military
seascape.47
B. PRIVATEERS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
While the larger European states had already begun to reduce their
reliance on privateers in the late eighteenth century due to their ability to
project naval military power on a wider scale, the thirteen American col-
onies “possessed little in the way of financial resources or naval might
during the Revolutionary War.”48 During the war, both the Continental
Congress and several of the individual states authorized privateers to
plunder British ships in the Caribbean and wider Atlantic Ocean.49 The
young American nation rapidly became “the world’s biggest proponent of
privateering.”50 Thomas Jefferson encouraged extensive use of privateers
and urged the public that “[e]very possible encouragement should be
given to privateering in time of war.”51 Jefferson’s belief that privateers
should be used to supplement the American navy was likely well
founded, as the thirteen colonies “had just sixty-four ships in [the] official
navy and commissioned only twenty-two ‘men of war’ during the con-
flict.”52 Privateers filled in the naval ranks as the Continental Congress
and state governments together authorized around 2,000 ships through-
out the Revolution.53 Three thousand eighty-seven British ships and over
$10 million in goods were captured under American letters of marque
and reprisal during the war, which caused “a great deal of harm to British
commerce.”54 Privateering efforts further hindered the British war effort
through the capture of “thousands of British seamen” which “depressed
the morale of the British public” and ultimately contributed to the shift in
sentiment against continuing the war.55
Besides their overwhelmingly effective use as an offensive tool, the
Americans realized that letters of marque and reprisal were also useful as
a means to provide their merchant fleet with the legal authorization for
self-defense. Thomas Jefferson wrote:
45. Sidak, supra note 24, at 473.
46. Id. at 468.
47. See HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 163 n.3 (Richard Tuck ed.,
Liberty Fund 2005) (1625).
48. Young, supra note 25, at 900–02 (citing HARRY M. WARD, THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION: NATIONHOOD ACHIEVED 1763–1788, at 184 (1995)).
49. Kessinger, supra note 2, at 6–7.
50. Robert P. DeWitte, Note, Let Privateers Marque Terrorism: A Proposal for a
Reawakening, 82 IND. L.J. 131, 134 (2007).
51. Id.
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The ship Jane is an English merchant vessel . . . employed in the
commerce between Jamaica and these States. She brought here a
cargo of produce . . ., and was to take away . . . flour. Knowing of the
war when she left Jamaica, and that our coast was lined with small
French privateers, she armed for her defense[sic], and took one of
those commissions usually called letters of marque. She arrived here
safely . . . . Can it be necessary to say that a merchant vessel is not a
privateer? That though she has arms to defend herself in time of war,
in the course of her regular commerce, this no more makes her a
privateer, than a husbandman following his plough in time of war,
with a knife or pistol in his pocket, is thereby made a soldier? The
occupation of a privateer is attack and plunder, that of a merchant
vessel is commerce and self-preservation.56
Overwhelmingly though, American privateers were motivated not by
self-defense but by the nearly limitless profit potential of privateering as
an enterprise.57 George Washington, Thomas Paine, and Benjamin
Franklin all owned shares in different privateering ventures during the
war.58 Privateers provided the American public with goods and luxury
items that were not generally available due to the British blockade, which
bolstered the economy and improved the public morale.59 Privateers had
an amazingly positive effect on American war efforts, which makes it un-
surprising that their authorization and legality would be assured in the
newly created federal government.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL RECOGNITION AND LATER USE
Both the Articles of Confederation and later the Constitution provided
mechanisms for the new American federal government to issue letters of
marque and reprisal. The Articles of Confederation granted the Conti-
nental Congress the power to “grant[ ] letters of marque and reprisal in
times of peace” and to create “rules for deciding, in all cases, what cap-
tures on land or water shall be legal, and in what manner prizes taken by
land or naval forces in the service of the United States, shall be divided or
appropriated.”60 While the Articles of Confederation are noted for re-
serving many powers to the states, the framers here were clear that priva-
teering was exclusively a federal-government concern, as they explicitly
prohibited the states from issuing letters of marque and reprisal without
the consent of the Continental Congress.61 In 1787, the Constitutional
Convention convened in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to address some of
56. Theodore T. Richard, Reconsidering the Letter of Marque: Utilizing Private Secur-
ity Providers Against Piracy, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 411, 437 (2010) (quoting Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris (Aug. 16, 1793), in III THOMAS JEFFERSON, MEM-
OIR, CORRESPONDENCE, AND MISCELLANIES, FROM THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
275 (Thomas Jefferson Randolph ed., 1829)).
57. Young, supra note 25, at 903.
58. Kessinger, supra note 2, at 7.
59. Young, supra note 25, at 903.
60. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 1.
61. Id. art. VI, para. 5.
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the issues caused by the Articles of Confederation.62 A representative
from Massachusetts proposed that Congress be granted the power to is-
sue letters of marque and reprisal, and the addition was approved by a
unanimous committee vote.63 Scholars have suggested that the framers
may have included this provision as a method “for the sovereign to re-
dress the injuries of its citizens when a declaration of war ‘may not be
deemed either expedient or necessary.’”64
Just under a decade after the ratification of the new Constitution in
1789, Congress had the occasion to issue its first letters of marque and
reprisal during the Quasi-War of 1798 against France.65 However, the im-
pact of the new congressional power to authorize a privateering fleet was
not fully brought to bear until the breakout of the War of 1812 with Brit-
ain.66 At the start of the war, the British Navy outnumbered the active
American vessels by over sixty-two to one.67 In response to this dire situ-
ation, Congress authorized the issuance of letters of marque and reprisal
that would complement the American war effort while also applying tight
regulations on the activities of privateers that wished to retain a legally
protected status.68 This legislation required each applicant to “list specific
details about the ship, crew, and owners, and ‘Ample security’ submitted
to ensure compliance with both international and United States law.”69
Additionally, each privateer was required to keep a detailed logbook of
their daily activities for inspection by any United States Navy vessel met
at sea or by the prize courts when returning to port.70 Specifically, these
logs demanded “a true and exact account of . . . the prizes he shall take;
the nature and probable value of such prizes; [and] the times and places,
when and where taken, and how and in what manner he shall dispose of
the same.”71 Any failure to follow these requirements would result in for-
feiture of the bond and possible prosecution for piracy.72 Throughout the
conflict, “privateers ‘proved to be the only effective American offensive
weapon’ of a war in which few, if any, significant American war aims
were accomplished.”73 American privateers were once again able to in-
flict huge losses on the British merchant fleet as they captured prizes
worth around $39 million at the time.74
62. See Young, supra note 25, at 905.
63. Sidak, supra note 24, at 477.
64. Young, supra note 25, at 906 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 411 (Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833)).
65. Id. at 897 (citing ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR: THE POLITICS AND
DIPLOMACY OF THE UNDECLARED WAR WITH FRANCE, 1797–1801, at 124 (1966)).
66. Kessinger, supra note 2, at 7.
67. Id.
68. An Act Concerning Letters of Marque, Prizes, and Prize Goods, ch. 107, § 9, 2
Stat. 759, 761 (1812) [hereinafter 1812 Privateering Act].
69. Kessinger, supra note 2, at 7.
70. Id. (citing 1812 Privateering Act, § 9, 2 Stat. at 761).
71. 1812 Privateering Act, § 10, 2 Stat. at 762.
72. Kessinger, supra note 2, at 7.
73. Young, supra note 25, at 907 (quoting DOROTHY DENNEEN VOLO & JAMES M.
VOLO, DAILY LIFE IN THE AGE OF SAIL 235 (2002)).
74. Kessinger, supra note 2, at 7.
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D. DECLINE OF PRIVATEERING AND THE PARIS
DECLARATION OF 1856
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, privateering en-
tered a slow but steady decline.75 As the major European powers ex-
panded their territories, “the need for private protection and reprisal
diminished; the sovereign was able to protect the interests of its subjects
without resort to private warfare.”76 While privateers remained active
well into the nineteenth century, in 1778, France was the last European
power to issue a letter of marque.77 In the United States, the end of the
War of 1812 saw the final authorization of privateers by the federal gov-
ernment.78 While President Andrew Jackson proposed the use of pri-
vateers against another quasi-conflict with France in the 1830s, Congress
never enacted the measure.79 However, during the Texas War of Indepen-
dence, the Texas legislature issued letters of marque for privateers to
“protect the coast, harass Mexican shipping, and bring prizes that could
be auctioned off, with part of the proceeds going to the public trea-
sury.”80 Even in this instance though, the usage of privateers was greatly
diminished compared to the American Revolution and War of 1812, as
the Texans only granted six letters of marque and reprisal for the entirety
of the six-month-long war.81
At the Congress of Paris in 1856, several of the major European pow-
ers met to settle the peace terms for the recently ended Crimean War.82
Damage to the shipping and commerce interests of all nations involved
led the negotiating parties to consider the termination of privateering as
an internationally accepted part of naval warfare.83 In particular, British
naval authorities feared that “[t]he Maritime population of the United
States . . . might furnish to Russia the elements of a fleet of privateers,
which attached to its service by Letters of Marque and covering the seas
with a network would harass and pursue [their] commerce even in the
most remote waters.”84 After their experiences at the hands of privateers
during the American Revolution and the War of 1812, the British were
keenly aware of the power of privateers to augment the navies of weaker
nations in a challenge to their own naval supremacy.85
75. Young, supra note 25, at 901, 907.
76. Id. at 900–01.
77. Id. at 901.
78. Id. at 907.
79. Kessinger, supra note 2, at 7 (citing FRANCIS H. UPTON, THE LAW OF NATIONS
AFFECTING COMMERCE DURING WAR: WITH A REVIEW OF THE JURISDICTION, PRACTICE
AND PROCEEDINGS OF PRIZE COURTS 175 (1863)).
80. Id. at 7–8.
81. Id. at 8 (citing Fortune Favors the Brave—The Story of the Texas Navy: Texas
Privateers, TEX. STATE LIBRARY & ARCHIVES COMM’N, https://www.tsl.texas.gov/exhibits/
navy/privateers.html [https://perma.cc/PD6Z-CG7U] (last modified June 24, 2019)).
82. Garrett, supra note 7, at 689.
83. Rosenzweig, supra note 27, at 112.
84. TRAVERS TWISS, BELLIGERENT RIGHT ON THE HIGH SEAS, SINCE THE DECLARA-
TION OF PARIS (1856), at 10 (1884).
85. Kessinger, supra note 2, at 8.
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The parties eventually settled on the final language of the Paris Decla-
ration of 1856, which essentially forbade signatories from issuing new let-
ters of marque and reprisal.86 The relevant parts of this agreement read:
The above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries, being duly authorized, re-
solved to concert among themselves as to the means of attaining this
object; and, having come to an agreement, have adopted the follow-
ing solemn Declaration: (1) Privateering is, and remains, abolished;
(2) The neutral flag covers enemy’s goods, with the exception of con-
traband of war; (3) Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband
of war, are not liable to capture under enemy’s flag; (4) Blockades, in
order to be binding, must be effective, that is to say, maintained by a
force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.87
Importantly, the drafters of the Paris Declaration were careful to make
certain that the agreement only bound the signatory nations.88 Eventually
forty-five other nations joined the original signatories to the treaty, but
the United States refused to be bound by the agreement.89 American na-
val authorities seemed to believe that the Paris Declaration was merely a
tool for the European powers, and specifically the British, to suppress the
seafaring capabilities of smaller nations.90 Secretary of State William L.
Marcy later voiced his opinion that “the United States could not forgo the
right to send out privateers, which in the past had proved her most effec-
tive maritime weapon in time of war, and which, since she had no large
navy, were essential to her fighting power.”91 American diplomats also
worried that the Paris Declaration did not provide for the absolute “pro-
tection of all non-contraband private property from capture at sea.”92
Both of these concerns weighed heavily enough on American diplomats
to reject the Paris Declaration, which left the United States free to con-
tinue issuing letters of marque and reprisal in the future.93
The final chapter of naval privateering in American history was written
during the Civil War. In April 1861, Confederate President Jefferson
Davis “issued letters of marque against Northern shipping” with the ap-
proval of the newly formed Confederate Congress.94 While the Confeder-
acy openly embraced privateering, Union diplomats initially made it
widely known that they would honor the Paris Declaration and even at-
tempted to join the United States as a signatory.95 Commentators have
suggested that Union leaders may have feared “the involvement of the
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British or French navies in the conflict,” a condition that could have ex-
posed the Union to a much broader conflict on the international stage.96
These efforts were ultimately futile; British vessels entered the conflict,
and the Union subsequently authorized its own letters of marque and
declared that any privateers sailing under the Confederate flag would be
treated like pirates if captured.97 Here, the legacy of the Paris Declara-
tion was called into question, as an international tribunal asked to deter-
mine the liability of Britain for damages caused by a privateer operating
under a Confederate letter of marque “found no issue with a non-signa-
tory (the Confederacy) issuing letters of marque to a signatory (Britain)
‘to construct, furnish, and crew ships to be used in commerce raids
against a non-signatory, the United States.’”98
Even though Congress has not exercised its power to grant letters of
marque and reprisal since the conclusion of the Civil War, this inactivity
is not reflective of a general acceptance of a prohibition of privateering.
During the Spanish-American War, the idea of again turning to privateer
forces was acknowledged by President McKinley, who announced that
the United States would voluntarily comply with the provisions of the
Paris Declaration while retaining the legal right to issue letters of marque
if needed.99 At the Hague Peace Conference in 1907, the United States
continued to insist on its unrestrained right to authorize privateers be-
cause “[i]t [was] well known that the Government of the United States of
America has not adhered to that Declaration.”100 Doubtless, the United
States still has the power to issue new letters of marque and reprisal and
could utilize this power to enable lawful cyber privateers without violat-
ing existing international law.
III. CRYPTOCURRENCY AS CONTEMPORARY DOUBLOONS
A. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF BITCOIN AND BLOCKCHAIN
The need for cyber privateers derives from the widespread adoption of
cryptocurrency, and specifically Bitcoin, by modern businesses and con-
sumers. As discussed above, a “Bitcoin is a digital, decentralized, partially
anonymous currency, not backed by any government or other legal entity,
96. Id.
97. An Act Concerning Letters of Marque, Prizes, and Prize Goods, ch. 85, 12 Stat.
758, 759 (1863); see JAMES RUSSELL SOLEY, THE BLOCKADE AND THE CRUISERS 170
(1883) (noting the Union never issued a letter of marque during the Civil War and that
captured Confederate privateers would be subject to execution after conviction).
98. Kessinger, supra note 2, at 9 (quoting Todd Emerson Hutchins, Comment, Struc-
turing a Sustainable Letters of Marque Regime: How Commissioning Privateers Can Defeat
the Somali Pirates, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 819, 857 (2011)).
99. Alexander Porter Morse, Rights and Duties of Belligerents and Neutrals from the
American Point of View, 46 AM. L. REG. 657, 660 (1898).
100. UNITED STATES, THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE, HELD AT
THE HAGUE FROM JUNE 15 TO OCTOBER 18, 1907: INSTRUCTIONS TO AND REPORT FROM
DELEGATES OF THE UNITED STATES, CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS, FINAL ACT,
WITH DRAFT OF CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE CONVENTIONS 40 (1908).
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and not redeemable for gold or other commodity.”101 Supporters of
Bitcoin have embraced it because it is highly liquid, generally has low
transaction costs, can be used to make micropayments across the internet,
and affords buyers and sellers a degree of anonymity that is not usually
attainable through the use of traditional currencies or credit cards.102
Bitcoin draws its origins to the early 1990s, when certain online groups
disdainful of government currency regulations desired a decentralized
and private method of exchange that would enable cooperation amongst
pseudonymous users.103 A workable solution was eventually developed in
the form of Bitcoin, which creator Satoshi Nakamoto (a pseudonym) re-
leased to the internet at large in the late 2000s.104 Nakamoto believed
that Bitcoin would address “the inherent weaknesses of the trust based
model” that serves as a basis for the modern global commerce framework
because Bitcoin is “an electronic payment system based on cryptographic
proof instead of trust, allowing any two willing parties to transact directly
with each other without the need for a trusted third party.”105
Nakamoto’s major breakthrough came in the form of the blockchain
protocol that allowed Bitcoin to function. At a high level, blockchain pro-
vides a sort of ledger where all transactions involving a Bitcoin are “pub-
licly announced” and each exchange cannot proceed until “participants
[in the network] . . . agree on a single history of the order in which they
were received.”106 This prevents a Bitcoin from being spent more than
one time by any participant in the system.107 Once a transaction has been
verified, it is recorded as a “block” in the chain of data that records the
movement of all available coins within the system.108 This ledger allows
the public to see that Bitcoins are being exchanged amongst different
users of the system but also provides for relative anonymity by associat-
ing only a “public key” with the users sending and receiving Bitcoin.109
These public keys protect the identities of their holders like usernames on
a website so that the public ledger is more “similar to the level of infor-
mation released by stock exchanges, where the time and size of individual
trades, the ‘tape’, is made public, but without telling who the parties
were.”110 Blockchain essentially allows Bitcoins to be transferred to and
from different users without the need for government control and pre-
101. Grinberg, supra note 13, at 160.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 162.
104. Id; see Bernard Marr, A Short History of Bitcoin and Crypto Currency Everyone
Should Read, FORBES (Dec. 6, 2017, 12:28 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/
2017/12/06/a-short-history-of-bitcoin-and-crypto-currency-everyone-should-read/#7e0cba
413f27 [https://perma.cc/TZK6-S6TN]. See generally Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-
Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN, http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/
P9DF-TAN9] (last visited Sept. 9, 2019).
105. Nakamoto, supra note 104, at 1.
106. Id. at 2.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 3–4.
109. Id. at 6.
110. Id.
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vents users from being forced to reveal their identities to the
counterparty or to the general public.
Individual Bitcoins are created through a complex set of computations
known as mining.111 When participants in the system “opt to lend their
computational resources to the Bitcoin network to perform the demand-
ing computational work needed to support” the verification of transac-
tions on the blockchain, they are rewarded for their efforts by the
distribution of new Bitcoins based on their share of the work.112
Nakamoto designed the system to incentivize users to provide the exten-
sive amounts of computational power that would be needed to run the
network and as “a way to initially distribute coins into circulation, since
there is no central authority to issue them.”113 While the early mining
efforts were the product of individual early adopters attempting to make
the system work, enterprising individuals soon realized that mining oper-
ations could be more efficiently “conducted by large-scale GPU farms
with multiple graphics processing units . . . working to perform the requi-
site calculations.”114 The entire process is rather similar “to gold miners
expending resources to add gold to circulation,” leading to the adoption
of the term “mining.”115 To protect the value of Bitcoin from rampant
inflation, Nakamoto included a mechanism that increased the difficulty of
the computations as the number of miners increased, which effectively
acts to cap the number of Bitcoins that can possibly be created.116 In
2012, approximately fifty Bitcoins were issued every ten minutes.117 This
rate has slowed since then, and the total supply of Bitcoin will eventually
be capped near 21 million coins.118 Similar to the U.S. dollar, Bitcoins are
divisible, although they can be subdivided out to eight decimal places in-
stead of only two.119
Individuals and businesses have several different options to obtain
Bitcoins. As detailed above, Bitcoins can be mined, although the enor-
mous amounts of electricity and computing power necessary to generate
a single coin have largely rendered this unprofitable for individuals in the
last five years.120 Alternatively, Bitcoin can be obtained through the
purchase and sale of goods and services.121 Many different online vendors
now accept Bitcoin, including auction sites, web hosts, technology con-
sulting firms, non-profit organizations, and even retail establishments.122
111. Engle, supra note 11, at 341.
112. Id. at 347 n.5 (quoting Pamela J. Martinson & Christopher P. Masterson, Bitcoin
and the Secured Lender, 33 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 13, 13–14 (2014)).
113. Nakamoto, supra note 104, at 4.
114. Engle, supra note 11, at 347 n.5 (quoting Martinson & Masterson, supra note 112,
at 13–14).
115. Nakamoto, supra note 104, at 4; Engle, supra note 11, at 347 n.5.
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The anonymity afforded by Bitcoin has given rise to its popularity as a
method of exchange for online casinos and adult novelty shops, and it has
unfortunately also been used in illegal marketplaces to trade for illicit
drugs, firearms, and even certain criminal services.123 Finally, Bitcoins
can be purchased for government-backed currency (like the U.S. dollar,
the Euro, or the Japanese yen) or for other forms of cryptocurrency on
specialized Bitcoin exchanges.124 These exchanges allow Bitcoin to be
traded for a relatively similar value across the globe, although the “ex-
change rate between Bitcoin and traditional currencies has fluctuated
wildly . . . compared to the relatively small movements often seen be-
tween traditional currency pairs.”125 The Mt. Gox online exchange, which
at one time was the largest Bitcoin exchange in existence, recorded daily
trading volumes of approximately $10,000 worth of Bitcoin per day in
March 2011.126 Unlike traditional foreign currency trading, Bitcoin ex-
changes generally do not offer futures trading although options can be
purchased over the counter.127
Generally, Bitcoins can be accessed through the use of a computer pro-
gram known as a “Bitcoin client” or through the creation of an account
on one of the many websites that runs this program for their clients in an
easier-to-navigate interface.128 The string of code that makes up a Bitcoin
is saved to a file known as a “Bitcoin wallet,” which must be kept se-
cure.129 This wallet file contains the public key, discussed above, and also
a private key that a user must enter into the Bitcoin client to access the
Bitcoins stored in the file.130 Many of the major exchanges offer “transac-
tion services, allowing individuals to keep, send, and receive [B]itcoins
without ever running the Bitcoin client on their own computers.”131
These services are convenient for the common consumer, but they have
been plagued with a serious problem: cyber piracy.132
B. THE GROWING THREAT OF BITCOIN THEFT
For the last decade, cyber pirates have targeted both individual holders
of Bitcoin and Bitcoin exchanges at an alarming rate. Since their creation,
Bitcoins have been subject to loss and theft similar to traditional cur-
rency.133 The blockchain itself is resistant to tampering, but individual
123. Id. at 165; Engle, supra note 11, at 343–44.
124. Engle, supra note 11, at 341 n.5 (quoting Martinson & Masterson, supra 114, at
13–14).
125. Id.
126. Grinberg, supra note 13, at 166.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 162–63.
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337–38 (2014).
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132. Engle, supra note 11, at 353.
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wallet files are not.134 Bitcoins can only be stolen from individual holders
“when someone completes an unauthorized transfer out of the authorized
user’s wallet by stealing the user’s private access key.”135 While the ne-
cessity of both the public and private key to access a wallet file does pro-
vide a modicum of security, hackers have found increasingly refined ways
“to seize an account’s private key.”136 Owners of Bitcoin have been con-
sistently warned to “backup and secure [their] Bitcoin wallet[s],” if they
keep their wallet files on their personal computers.137 However, personal
computers have been particularly vulnerable to viruses that install them-
selves onto a user’s computer and then automatically allow the cyber pi-
rate who created the virus to access that user’s wallet.138 In early 2011,
one Russian scammer was able to steal over 150 Bitcoins from unwary
users.139 The victims had each installed a program that purported to back
up their wallet files for added security but was actually transmitting each
victim’s Bitcoins to the scammer.140
Although Bitcoin exchanges and transaction services providers should
arguably be able to provide more security to their clients, they have fallen
prey to some of the most ambitious thefts yet perpetrated. In fact, the
largest Bitcoin thefts on record occurred when hackers attacked ex-
changes, rather than individual owners of Bitcoin.141 Cyber pirates are
responsible for raids on several different exchanges, including TradeHill,
Bitcoinica, and Mt. Gox, to the tune of millions of dollars’ worth of
cryptocurrency plunder.142 Some commentators have argued that ex-
changes are frequently targeted because “the current trading infrastruc-
ture ‘is riddled with security/efficiency problems,’”143 and a significant
“lack of oversight . . . permits” exchanges to operate without the safe-
guards necessary to prevent criminals from easily infiltrating their inter-
nal networks.144 Unlike when an FDIC-insured bank is robbed, when
exchanges are hacked, their customers bear the brunt of the losses be-
cause “Bitcoin transactions are not insured against loss.”145 Scholars have
noted that this is one of the major areas where Bitcoin falls behind tradi-
tional currencies, as it currently offers little chance of recovery.146
134. Arrun˜ada, supra note 16, at 98 n.3.
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The cautionary tale of the Mt. Gox exchange is one of the largest pub-
licity hits ever suffered by a Bitcoin exchange. The Mt. Gox exchange was
founded in 2010 and, for the first half of the 2010s, dominated the market
for Bitcoin transaction services.147 While Mt. Gox was attacked once in
2011, that breach was relatively small, and the exchange was able to keep
the story from spreading widely across the Bitcoin community.148 By
2013, the Mt. Gox exchange was handling an estimated eighty percent of
the world’s Bitcoin transactions.149 During February 2014, customers of
the Mt. Gox exchange were shocked as the exchange first suspended
withdrawals from user accounts, then suspended trading entirely, and fi-
nally closed the platform before filing for bankruptcy protection in Ja-
pan.150 Documents were eventually leaked, which showed that cyber
pirates were able to make off with around $473 million worth of
cryptocurrency with the exchange’s customers bearing nearly ninety per-
cent of the loss.151
The repercussions of the Mt. Gox hack still affect the Bitcoin economy
today, as the CEO of the exchange is facing criminal charges in Japan,
and Bitcoin exchanges have since been subjected to higher levels of regu-
latory scrutiny than ever before.152 However, even as nations have started
to bring their regulatory power to bear on the problems presented by
Bitcoin, one major issue has evaded a workable solution—How can
Bitcoins that have been stolen by cyber pirates be returned to their right-
ful owners?
IV. HOW CYBER PRIVATEERS CAN CRUSH THE
BLACKBEARDS OF THE MODERN AGE
A. ADAPTING LETTERS OF MARQUE TO CYBERSPACE
Congress can exercise its constitutional power to issue letters of mar-
que and reprisal to authorize a new force of cyber privateers. Victims of
Bitcoin piracy could seek out these specialists, who would then provide
cheap and efficient redress. Article I, Section Eight of the Constitution
states, “Congress shall have Power To . . . grant Letters of Marque and
Reprisal.”153 As discussed above, the United States has retained this abil-
ity despite the agreement of other nations to forgo the practice.154 This
section argues how letters of marque should be adapted to provide legal
authorization for cyber privateers to recover stolen digital assets, how ex-
isting prize court legislation for naval captures could be implemented in a
147. Darryn Pollock, The Mess That Was Mt. Gox: Four Years On, COINTELEGRAPH
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cyber context, and how Bitcoin would play an extremely important role
as the profit motive to incentivize private parties to partake in the new
framework.
1. Issuing Cyber Letters of Marque and Supervising Cyber Privateers
A legislative basis for the issuance of new cyber letters of marque and
subsequent supervision of the cyber privateers can be found in the autho-
rizations made for privateers on the high seas during the Revolutionary
War and the War of 1812. Congress could either grant the power to issue
letters of marque and reprisal to the President, or it could delegate that
power directly to a new or existing administrative agency.155 Congress
could then lay out the requirements that any applicant for a cyber letter
of marque would have to satisfy before approval. In the 1812 Privateering
Act, Congress required “[t]hat all persons applying for letters of marque
and reprisal . . . shall state in writing the name . . . and force of the vessel,
and the name and place of residence of each owner concerned therein,
and the intended number of the crew.”156 Modern legislation might re-
quire that each applicant name the computer security firm that is apply-
ing for the letter of marque, the owners of said firm, and the number of
computer specialists that the firm intends to set to work on recovering
stolen assets. Other commentators have suggested that a “central govern-
ment database . . . would provide the supervising agency with a means
of . . . policing cyber privateers and holding them accountable.”157
Additionally, the 1812 Privateering Act required that each “owner . . .
of the ship . . . and the commander thereof, for the time being, shall give
bond to the United States . . . with condition that the owners, officers, and
crew . . . will observe the treaties and laws of the United States.”158 Con-
gress could demand that each applicant put up a bond, which would serve
the dual purposes of (1) screening out smaller, undercapitalized firms that
may not have the financial resources to provide redress in the case of any
improper captures; and (2) ensuring that each cyber privateer has suffi-
cient “skin in the game” to discourage illegal activity. The bond should be
large enough to deal a severe financial blow to the firm should it ever be
forfeited. With the immense amount of profit that these firms stand to
make, a bond in the low millions of dollars would likely suffice.
Finally, Congress could require that each member of the modern
“crew” have a requisite level of education in computer science before
allowing them to operate as cyber privateers. While the 1812 Privateering
Act did not give any training requirements for the seamen that may be
aboard a privateering vessel, an education requirement would provide
the supervising agency another opportunity to preemptively vet all of the
firm’s personnel. Like demanding a bond, setting a minimum educational
155. See 1812 Privateering Act, ch. 107, § 1–2, 2 Stat. 759, 759 (1812).
156. Id. § 2.
157. Kessinger, supra note 2, at 19.
158. 1812 Privateering Act, § 3, 2 Stat. at 759.
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threshold would also operate to “keep the cyber cutthroats out of this
business” by making sure that only those computer technicians “with the
requisite discretion and technical expertise are . . . acting with congres-
sional authority as a cyber privateer.”159
Once a cyber letter of marque has been issued, Congress could require
that each computer-security firm keep a log of the individual technician’s
actions online, back up any capture by evidence of attribution, and imme-
diately declare each capture to the supervisory agency. The 1812 Priva-
teering Act set out that each “commanding officer of every vessel having
a commission . . . shall keep a regular journal” of their daily sailing activi-
ties and the specific details of any prizes that were taken.160 The com-
mander was required to turn over this log to any U.S. naval officer whom
he might encounter while at sea and also to present his log to naval au-
thorities when the vessel returned to port after a voyage.161 This could
easily be applied to cyber privateers who would merely be asked to keep
a record of their online activity, and specifically, facts relating to any
seizure of digital assets. This would allow the supervisory agency to police
the privateers and would serve as another deterrent to prevent them from
acting outside of their letter of marque.
A unique issue presented by cyber privateering, and specifically the
recovery of cryptocurrency like Bitcoin, is the problem of attribution. To
prove that the digital assets being seized by a cyber privateer are actually
stolen, it would be necessary for the original theft to be attributed to the
actor being attacked by the privateer.162 This issue is similar to that
presented by identifying an enemy naval ship but can be much more diffi-
cult. While it is theoretically easy to track an individual’s online activity,
in practice it can present several difficulties, especially in an asset-recov-
ery context.163 In the past, the anonymity provided by Bitcoin transac-
tions made it very difficult, if not impossible, for the activities of hackers
and thieves to be monitored on a large scale.164 However, recent ad-
vances in the analysis of the blockchain ledgers have led researchers to
conclude that “[B]itcoin transactions are . . . pseudonymous, not anony-
mous.”165 Because all Bitcoin transactions are recorded in a manner al-
lowing all users to see the public keys associated with any given exchange,
some scholars have suggested that modern computer science techniques
might allow authorities to identify all users of Bitcoin in the near fu-
ture.166 Even cyber pirates must have public keys that can “accept” stolen
159. Kessinger, supra note 2, at 20.
160. 1812 Privateering Act, § 10, 2 Stat. at 761–62.
161. Id. § 11, 2 Stat. at 762.
162. See Rosenzweig, supra note 27, at 116.
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166. Engle, supra note 11, at 393 n.303 (quoting Nicholas Godlove, Note, Regulatory
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Bitcoin for the transaction to be recorded in the ledger. These advances
would allow cyber privateers to track the movement of stolen Bitcoins
from their rightful owner to the public keys of the pirates, who could then
be identified. Congress could require that this evidence be collected and
presented with the prize at the time of “capture,” which would mitigate
the chances of any erroneous seizures.
Privateers of old were commanded to bring their prizes to U.S. ports,
where the prize would be turned over to the prize courts for condemna-
tion.167 Similarly, Congress could demand that cyber privateers immedi-
ately declare any capture to the supervisory agency and then refer the
seizure to prize courts for official condemnation. An immediate declara-
tion would ensure that the prize cause was commenced while the relevant
evidence was still fresh and would provide any aggrieved party a quick
opportunity to rebut the seizure. A prize court system would render im-
portant checks on the actions of cyber privateers, as these courts would
evaluate whether the evidence of attribution is believable and would ulti-
mately determine whether the capture was made within the bounds of the
privateer’s letter of marque. Luckily, Congress has already created a
framework for naval privateering that could be modified for cyber
privateering.
2. A Theoretical Framework for Cyber Prize Courts
Congress can refashion the existing legislation for naval prize courts to
administer the prize causes generated in cyberspace. Prize courts are judi-
cial tribunals that operate to “allow[ ] privateers, or private individuals
acting pursuant to governmental commissions, to seize the assets of en-
emy ships and retain the assets as their legitimate capture.”168 The body
of law generated by prize courts is applicable to modern piracy in cyber-
space because it shares many characteristics with the piracy that once
troubled the high seas. Before the development of maritime law, the
ocean was a relatively lawless place. During a long journey, ships could
“be miles away from nearby witnesses, police, or courts.”169 The ocean
was (and still is) critical to commerce and, even today, there are troubles
with piracy in certain parts of the world.170 The internet too has devel-
oped into an important part of global trade. Like the ocean during the
Age of Exploration, it is difficult for governments to impose the rule of
law on the vast reaches of cyberspace as technological constraints, juris-
dictional challenges, and the dispersed nature of the internet’s users
Although Bitcoin addresses aren’t immediately associated with real-world
identities, computer scientists have done much work figuring out how to de-
anonymize ‘anonymous’ social networks. The block chain is a marvelous tar-
get for these techniques. The great majority of Bitcoin users will be identified
with relatively high confidence and ease in the near future.
Id.
167. 1812 Privateering Act, ch. 107, § 6, 2 Stat. 759, 761 (1812).
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“have forestalled the ability of governments to effectively regulate it.”171
Although Congress has not authorized the issuance of any new letters
of marque and reprisal for over two centuries, during the 1950s, it
preemptively passed reworked procedures for new prize court proceed-
ings should U.S. privateers ever again capture enemy vessels during a
time of war.172 This legislation “applies to all captures of vessels as prize
during war by authority of the United States” but does not cover
“[p]roperty seized or taken upon the inland waters of the United States
by its naval forces.”173 Congress could amend the legislation to cover all
captures of cryptocurrency made under the authority of a letter of mar-
que, whether seized from American or foreign criminals.
The procedures of a prize cause are relatively simple. Congress granted
the federal district courts “original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of
the States, of each prize and each proceeding for the condemnation of
property taken as prize.”174 “[P]roceedings for the adjudication of the
prize cause” can be brought either in the district court closest to the port
where the prize was turned over to the government or in a venue chosen
by the Attorney General if the capture was made in territorial waters of a
consenting cobelligerent.175 The proceedings must commence within a
reasonable time, or “any party claiming the captured property may . . .
bring an original suit for restitution.”176 These procedures could easily be
adapted for a prize cause pertaining to digital assets that have been seized
by cyber privateers. The district court where a cyber privateer operates
would have jurisdiction over prize causes relating to any captures made
by that privateer, and the requirement that proceedings be started within
a “reasonable time” would provide a safeguard against an innocent
party’s assets being seized and held without a reasonably speedy hearing.
Once a captured vessel has been brought into U.S. jurisdiction, govern-
ment officials and the privateer have several different roles and responsi-
bilities to fulfill. U.S. attorneys are responsible for representing the
United States in any prize cause brought within their judicial district.177
They are charged with “protect[ing] the interests of the United States
and . . . examin[ing] all fees, costs, and expenses sought to be charged
against the prize fund.”178 The commanding officer of the vessel that ef-
fectuates the capture must supply any relevant documents and the wit-
171. Id. at 690.
172. 10 U.S.C. §§ 8851–8881 (1956).
173. Id. § 8851(a)–(c).
174. Id. § 8852(a). This jurisdiction only applies to prizes that are brought into “(1) the
United States, or the Commonwealths or possessions; (2) . . . the territorial waters of a
cobelligerent; (3) . . . a locality in the temporary or permanent possession of, or occupied
by, the armed forces of the United States; or (4) appropriated for the use of the United
States.” Id. § 8852(a)(1)–(4). This jurisdiction can only be exercised over prizes captured or
brought into the waters of a cobelligerent if that nation consents to the proceedings. Id.
§ 8852(c).
175. Id. § 8853(a)–(b).
176. Id. § 8854(2).
177. Id. § 8856(a).
178. Id.
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nesses of the capture to the prize commissioner for investigation.179 Prize
commissioners are appointed to serve in each judicial district,180 and they
are responsible for taking possession of the proof of lawful capture, creat-
ing interrogatories for the privateer, interviewing any witnesses, and re-
porting all of their findings to the prize court.181 Once the prize
commissioner has gathered all of the necessary evidence, the U.S. attor-
ney “shall promptly—(1) file a libel against the prize property; (2) obtain
a warrant from the court directing the marshal to take custody of the
prize property; and (3) proceed to obtain a condemnation of the prop-
erty.”182 In a cyber privateering prize cause, these duties could remain
relatively unchanged. The U.S. attorney would still represent the U.S.
government, and the prize commissioner would still be charged with col-
lecting evidence to present before the prize court. Only the role of the
“commanding officer” would be altered. The privateer would be required
to produce all of their online history logs, detailed information of exactly
how the seizure was made, and the information for the new account
where the seized Bitcoins were being held.
Finally, assuming that the prize court determined that the seizure was
made lawfully within the restrictions of the privateer’s letter of marque,
the shares of the prize would be divided. Normally the prize court would
order the sale of the condemned prize,183 which would then be performed
by an auctioneer after notice had been posted for several days.184 How-
ever, when a privateer recovers private property that was captured by the
enemy, “the court shall restore the property to its owner upon his claim
and on payment of such sum as the court may award as salvage, costs, and
expenses.”185 In the case of stolen Bitcoins, this section would not need to
be changed at all. An individual robbed of their Bitcoins would only need
to file a report with the cyber privateering oversight agency, which would
then alert the privateers of the theft. Once a privateer located and recov-
ered the cryptocurrency, the prize courts would merely turn the Bitcoins
back over to the rightful owner, while allowing the privateer to take a
percentage of the Bitcoin as payment for their services. In this way,
changes can be made to the preexisting legal framework to provide for
workable and efficient procedures to affirm the legality of captures and
return Bitcoins to their owners.
3. Bitcoin as a Profit Motive
Bitcoins play an exceedingly important role in this proposed cyber pri-
vateering framework, as they would serve as the profit motive necessary
to incentivize those with the skills to act as cyber privateers to perform
179. Id. § 8857.
180. Id. § 8855(a).
181. Id. § 8860.
182. Id. § 8859(a).
183. Id. § 8865(a)(1).
184. Id. § 8866.
185. Id. § 8872(c).
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this work. During the American Revolution, the privateers did not attack
British merchant shipping for private redress.186 They “sailed for the
profits they would receive by capturing and selling goods[,] . . . [which]
were potentially enormous.”187 One of the greatest problems that other
proposals for cyber privateering have faced is the lack of a reasonable
incentive for skilled computer technicians to dedicate their time and en-
ergy to working within the strict legal framework of privateering.188 In an
information security context, this problem is especially troubling as the
information that cyber privateers would be protecting or recovering could
hypothetically be sold to provide the privateer with some share of the
value, and that would defeat the entire purpose of creating cyber pri-
vateers in the first place.189 Another issue with information is that it has
no set value; any sale designed to get the highest price would almost cer-
tainly require some sort of auction, which again contravenes the intention
of authorizing privateers at all.190 Some scholars have suggested that
Congress could circumvent this problem by paying privateers a flat fee
for their services.191 This solution would require that the taxpayers fund
the program, which is not desirable. The situation before the introduction
of cryptocurrency seemed to leave scholars between a rock and a hard
place, as cyber privateers would either need to be repaid out of public
funds or through the creation of unsavory secondary markets that would
essentially undermine the purpose of a cyber privateering program.
However, a regime aimed at the recovery of stolen Bitcoins proffers a
way to build cyber privateering around a marketable asset that could be
easily valued and sold without revealing sensitive information or placing
the privateers on the taxpayer’s dime. Bitcoin is different from informa-
tion because cryptocurrencies have defined values set by exchanges.192
The availability of an exchange rate determined by the market from
thousands of transactions per day eliminates the need for an auction to
dispose of the seized Bitcoins. The court could simply refer to the prevail-
ing exchange rate between BTC and USD at the time of condemnation
and then take a predetermined percentage of that value to pay the cyber
privateer, as well as the court costs associated with the prize cause. The
remainder of the Bitcoins could then be returned to their original
owner(s). In this way, the private party would receive the benefits from
recovery of their Bitcoins for a reasonable commission, and justice would
be done without any subsidy from taxpayers. Additionally, Bitcoins are
not like sensitive information in that they can be sold without completely
subverting the purpose of authorizing cyber privateers. Ultimately, this
186. Young, supra note 25, at 903.
187. Id.
188. See Garrett, supra note 7, at 705 (noting that, in a national defense context, Con-





192. Grinberg, supra note 13, at 167.
918 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
would allow for victims of Bitcoin theft to recover their stolen assets with
very little bureaucracy or cost.
B. PRECEDENTS FOR NON-TRADITIONAL REDRESS
BY PRIVATE ACTORS
Several different scholars and politicians have actually suggested the
use of privateers as a remedy for modern problems in just the last two
decades.193 One of the most notable examples occurred in 2007, when
Representative Ron Paul proposed a bill to the House of Representatives
designed “[t]o authorize the President to issue letters of marque and re-
prisal with respect to certain acts of air piracy upon the United States on
September 11, 2001.”194 The bill was meant to further the U.S. effort in
the War on Terror.195 The bill would have allowed privateers “to employ
all means reasonably necessary to seize outside the geographic bounda-
ries of the United States and its territories the person and property of
Osama bin Laden, [and] of any al Qaeda co-conspirator.”196 While the
bill ultimately failed to pass, it illustrated the willingness of American
lawmakers to return to privateers as a viable solution to problems where
traditional measures are unlikely to reach the desired result.
Both the federal and state governments have already approved of
other nontraditional methods to provide aggrieved parties with private
redress, including the use of bounty hunters. In 1872, the Supreme Court
declared that bounty hunting was a legal practice that should be endorsed
as a sometimes more effective alternative to law enforcement action.197
This endorsement continues to this day, as the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation and the U.S. Marshals Service each offer bounties ranging from
$25,000 to $1,000,000 on fugitives listed on their respective “Most
Wanted” lists.198 States have also authorized private citizens to act as
bounty hunters, and “[m]ost states have statutes that detail their licensing
requirements, the bounty hunter’s arrest authority, and insurance re-
quirements.”199 Similar to the proposed privateering framework, certain
states also require that each bounty hunter be registered and put up a
bond with the state.200 Unlike bounty hunting, cyber privateering would
involve no physical conflict and would not risk the life of either the priva-
teer or the target cybercriminal.
Perhaps a closer analogy to cyber privateering is the remedy of repos-
session. Repossession occurs when a secured creditor seeks to regain pos-
session of chattel pledged as collateral on a debt from the debtor without
193. See H.R. 3216, 110th Cong. (2007); Hutchins, supra note 98, at 861–62.
194. H.R. 3216, 110th Cong. (2007).
195. See id.
196. Id.
197. Kessinger, supra note 2, at 13.
198. Id. at 13 n.159.
199. Id. at 14.
200. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 648.30(1)–(3) (West 2011).
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judicial process.201 Creditors embrace this remedy because “it is a quick,
secure, and inexpensive method for the creditor” to recover the collat-
eral.202 While the Supreme Court has ruled against state seizures of per-
sonal property without the opportunity for the aggrieved party to have
notice and a hearing,203 challenges against repossession have largely been
unsuccessful, and the practice is still generally accepted throughout the
United States.204 Repossession is tolerated even though some of its uses
may result in physical confrontations, as popularized by many reality tele-
vision programs. Like repossession, cyber privateers would be acting to
return property to its rightful owner in the cheapest and fastest manner.
But again, it is important to note that cyber privateering would not risk
physical injury to any party involved and would also be subject to over-
sight by a supervisory agency, as well as the modified prize court system.
Overall, these precedents show that the American public is generally in
favor of allowing victims to embrace self-help mechanisms and that a po-
litical appetite for privateering in modern America still exists despite the
practice’s disuse on the high seas for over a century. These precedents
also illustrate that the right framework is likely to be accepted by the
judicial system, as the judiciary already endorses practices that involve far
more danger of error or physical harm than would be at play in cyber
privateering.
V. ADDRESSING MAJOR CONCERNS AND
FEARS OF REPRISAL
A. LEGAL CHALLENGES
While resurrecting letters of marque and reprisal in a cyber context is
clearly constitutionally permissible, there are several issues raised by ex-
isting domestic and international law that may call the legality of cyber
privateers into question. Domestically, the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (CFAA) stands as a substantial obstacle that would have to be
amended before cyber privateers could operate without fear of criminal
or civil liability. The CFAA was originally designed to protect govern-
ment computers from external, unauthorized intrusions.205 The statute
eventually evolved to impose civil liability on anyone who accesses and
causes damage to a computer “used in a manner that affects interstate or
foreign commerce,” which could theoretically apply to any computer in
the world.206 While some case law seems to suggest that courts will refuse
201. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Secured Transactions: Right of Secured Party to
Take Possession of Collateral on Default Under UCC § 9-503, 25 A.L.R.5th 696, § 2a
(1994).
202. Id.
203. See generally N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975);
Sniadach v. Fam. Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969).
204. See Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, Validity, Under State Law, of Self-Help Reposses-
sion of Goods Pursuant to UCC § 9-503, 75 A.L.R.3d 1061, § 2 (1977).
205. Kessinger, supra note 2, at 15.
206. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (2012); see id. § 1030(g).
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to impose liability without “damage,”207 scholars have concluded that pri-
vate parties would almost certainly not be able to seize digital assets with-
out government authorization.208 If Congress were to authorize the
issuance of cyber letters of marque, it would need to amend the CFAA to
allow the cyber privateers to complete their functions without exposure
to civil liability. This change could be modeled after the existing excep-
tion for law enforcement and intelligence agencies209 and would be in
accord with requests from other critics who have recommended that Con-
gress remove the potential liability for U.S. servicemembers who perform
operations in cyberspace.210
On the international stage, there are no definite legal constraints that
would prevent the United States from issuing new letters of marque, but
the proposed framework does raise some possibility of criminal or civil
liability in foreign jurisdictions. As previously discussed, the United
States is not bound by the Paris Declaration of 1856, due to its refusal to
become a signatory party and its longstanding opposition to the treaty’s
provisions.211 More recently, the United States and several major Euro-
pean states came together in 2001 to create the Budapest Convention
with the aim of curbing international cybercrime.212 These accords essen-
tially ask each signatory to identify and outlaw certain cybercrime activi-
ties but leave the signatories “free, if they wish, to permit such conduct
when it occurs pursuant to established legal defenses, excuses, or justifi-
cation.”213 Scholars have opined that the document is rife with opportuni-
ties for signatory nations to refuse to comply and that it completely lacks
the necessary enforcement mechanism to render it effective.214 Ulti-
mately, because the treaty only asks signatories to outlaw and prosecute
“‘illegal access,’ ‘illegal interception,’ [and] criminal ‘misuse of devices,’”
the United States would not violate it by issuing new letters of marque, as
this action is entirely permissible under existing U.S. constitutional
law.215
The most pressing legal concern for the United States in authorizing
cyber privateers would be the possibility of civil liability, criminal liability,
or requests for extradition under foreign laws. It is unlikely that anyone
would apply for a cyber letter of marque if the risk of foreign prosecution
was not addressed preemptively. Germany, for example, has criminalized
cyber self-defense and could choose to prosecute cyber privateers for
207. See generally United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1078–79 (1st Cir. 1997);
Moulton v. VC3, No. 1:00CV434-TWT, 2000 WL 33310901, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 7, 2000).
208. Kessinger, supra note 2, at 15–16.
209. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(f).
210. Picard, supra note 8, at 129.
211. See supra Part II.D.
212. Rosenzweig, supra note 27, at 108–09.
213. Id. at 109.
214. See Kessinger, supra note 2, at 18–19; Rosenzweig, supra note 27, at 109.
215. Kessinger, supra note 2, at 19 (quoting Council of Europe, Convention on Cyber-
crime, 6 Nov. 23, 2001, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-11, E.T.S. No. 185).
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their activities under this law.216 There are several possible solutions to
this problem, the first being to ignore foreign laws entirely. While this is
certainly the option that carries the most risk, it may be feasible as some
countries, like Germany, that have criminalized cyber self-defense have
been rather lax in actually enforcing these laws against violators in their
own jurisdictions.217
Alternatively, the United States could seek the assent of foreign na-
tions for American cyber privateers to seize assets belonging to cyber pi-
rates residing in those jurisdictions. The existing U.S. laws for naval prize
courts include a section specifically dealing with the necessity of consent
from “cobelligerents” and the effects of such consent.218 While some na-
tions may be initially reluctant, it is quite likely that they would agree to
these recovery measures, if the accuracy of any seizure could be reasona-
bly established and the actions do not affect the property of uninvolved
third parties.219 After all, privateers are fundamentally different from pi-
rates, as they act with legal authorization from their sponsoring govern-
ment and are bound by the provisions of their letter of marque. Like the
efforts of major powers to keep their citizens and commerce safe on the
seas, efforts to reduce the impact of cyber piracy are also likely to be met
with sympathy from foreign nations.220 Overall, the only major legal chal-
lenge to the establishment of a cyber privateering regime is the CFAA; it
is highly likely that the United States would be able to negotiate with the
international community for the privateers’ immunity from civil or crimi-
nal liability because of the inherently defensive nature of the privateers’
actions.
B. PRACTICAL CONCERNS
Critics of the revival of privateering have raised the alarm over several
different practical difficulties that may arise in a cyber-privateering
framework, but these worries are largely overblown. Concerns for the
safety of privateers are largely only applicable in a physical—rather than
cyber—context, such as the use of letters of marque to combat the piracy
problem off the coast of Somalia.221 Cyber privateers would operate from
the safety of the United States, without exposure to physical danger and
out of the reach of foreign powers that may oppose the seizure of
Bitcoins from their jurisdictions.222 Some critics have argued that the
danger of a cyber privateer going “rogue” is much too great and that any
216. See Rosenzweig, supra note 27, at 114.
217. See id. at 114–15.
218. 10 U.S.C. § 8881 (2012).
219. See Rabkin, supra note 28, at 220.
220. Id. at 216.
221. See Hutchins, supra note 98, at 843–44; Kessinger, supra note 2, at 14.
222. Cf. Young, supra note 25, at 929–30 (noting that if privateers were authorized to
conduct physical operations in the jurisdiction of a foreign nation, the United States would
need to consider the risk of their capture and possible war).
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supervisory authority would be unable to effectively monitor their activi-
ties at all times.
It is true that in the past some privateers did exceed the bounds of their
letters of marque, such as the famous example of Captain William Kidd.
In 1696, Kidd received a letter of marque from King William III of En-
gland to combat the growing threat of piracy in the Caribbean, but Kidd
turned to piracy within months of the start of his voyage.223 In modern
times, similar abuses by private contractors hired by the U.S. Army in the
Middle East have called into question the ability of private companies to
operate legally.224 But Congress has several tools at its disposal to curb
any piratical behavior in cyber privateers. First, as discussed above, Con-
gress could impose stringent training and monitoring requirements on ap-
plicants for letters of marque.225 Additionally, the threat of forfeiture of a
privateer’s bond would likely act as a strong deterrent to any temptation
to skirt the law.226 If Congress desired to prepare further safeguards, it
could legislate the creation of cyber courts-martial with procedures simi-
lar to those instituted by the United States for naval privateers long
ago.227
Some opponents of cyber privateering might argue that the recovery of
stolen Bitcoin is best left to law enforcement agencies who are already
empowered to pursue these assets and detain the thieves. However, “law
enforcement personnel are questionably competent when it comes to
cyber attacks and cybercrime.”228 Private firms have many advantages
that law enforcement agencies do not, as they “can offer much larger sal-
aries to researchers and more desirable working conditions.”229 Private
firms also have the capability to exchange information about cyberattacks
and new cyber-tracing techniques amongst themselves, as they are not
encumbered by security regulations that apply to governmental agencies
and employees.230 Law enforcement agencies are particularly at a disad-
vantage in tracking the perpetrators of Bitcoin theft, as the necessary
electronic tracing is beyond the skills demanded by traditional law en-
forcement roles.231 Ultimately, “limit[ing] the potential for private in-
volvement in [the recovery of stolen Bitcoin] is to forgo a vast amount of
potential reinforcement” that is desperately needed in the effort to return
stolen assets to their rightful owners.232
Finally, there is the worry that cyber privateers might seize Bitcoins
that were not actually stolen. Both the proposed solutions to the attribu-
tion problem and the use of a modified prize court system discussed
223. See Garrett, supra note 7, at 700.
224. See Young, supra note 25, at 919–20.
225. See supra Part IV.A.1.
226. See id.
227. Young, supra note 25, at 920.
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231. Rho, supra note 29, at 713–14.
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above would act as safeguards against an erroneous seizure, as the priva-
teer would be required to present evidence that the seized Bitcoins were
those taken from the victim and that evidence would be evaluated by an
impartial judge.233 Besides this, Congress could include an opportunity
for any aggrieved party to appeal from a condemnation decision. The ex-
isting legislation for naval prize causes already allows “an appeal in a
prize cause if it appears that a notice of appeal was filed . . . within thirty
days after the final decree in that cause.”234 This provision could be car-
ried over to the modified cyber prize cause framework and would ensure
that a cyber privateer is only paid once their seizure has cleared the entire
prize court system with ample opportunities for any opposition to be
heard. It is quite clear that any practical obstacles to a cyber-privateering
regime are either overstated or can be easily addressed through addi-
tional legislation from Congress or rulemaking by the new oversight
agency.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, letters of marque provide Congress with a cheap and
effective method to address the growing threat of cyber piracy in relation
to Bitcoin. The United States currently fails to offer its citizens a means
to recover their stolen cryptocurrency in a timely fashion, and cyber pri-
vateers could fill that need with only minimal expense to the taxpayer.
The government faces a situation similar to that of the Navy during the
Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, as law enforcement is woefully
underprepared to address the challenges presented by cryptocurrency,
but private enterprise could step in to stem the tide of cyber piracy.
The idea of using privateers to solve a tough issue is not new. There is
ample precedent for the government to authorize private redress, from
the historical examples of letters of marque to the modern practices of
bounty hunting and repossession. Recently proposed bills suggest that
politicians have not dismissed the possibility of using privateers to solve
difficult problems that are otherwise challenging or costly. The resuscita-
tion of this constitutional power has academic backing, as one scholar has
stated, “[A]s a means to commission private actors to augment national
forces in international crises, the Letter of Marque and Reprisal could yet
have modern applications. It remains for innovative executive and legisla-
tive experiment to revive the ancient practice in a form befitting modern
international problems.”235
There are risks inherent in this course of action, but they are managea-
ble because cyber privateering is highly unlikely to result in the physical
harm of American citizens or foreign nationals. The threat of cyber piracy
is not just an American problem, so the United States must work with the
233. See supra Part IV.A.1–2.
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international community to fight back against the worrying trend of at-
tacks on Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. As it seems more and more
likely that Bitcoin and its cousins will fundamentally alter the way that
consumers and businesses interact online, the government must take a
more proactive role in protecting the owners of these assets from those
who would enrich themselves unjustly. The issuance of cyber letters of
marque would be a strong first step towards countering these criminals.
With international cooperation and the right institutional safeguards in
place, cyber privateers may be able to severely cripple the piratical activi-
ties of the scourges of the new oceans.
